Proof-theoretic methods are developed for subsystems of Johansson's logic obtained by extending the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic with weak negations. These methods are exploited to establish properties of the logical systems. In particular, cut-free complete sequent calculi are introduced and used to provide a proof of the fact that the systems satisfy the Craig interpolation property. Alternative versions of the calculi are later obtained by means of an appropriate loop-checking history mechanism. Termination of the new calculi is proved, and used to conclude that the considered logical systems are PSPACE-complete.
Introduction
Minimal propositional calculus (Minimalkalkül, denoted here as MPC) is the system obtained from the positive fragment of intuitionistic propositional calculus (equivalently, positive logic [27] ) by adding a unary negation operator satisfying the so-called principle of contradiction (sometimes referred to as reductio ad absurdum, e.g., in [24] ). This system was introduced in this form by Johansson in 1937 [21] , and goes back to Kolmogorov's first formalization of intuitionistic logic [22] , obtained by discarding ex falso quodlibet (ex falso, from now on) from the nowadays standard axioms for intuitionistic logic. A letter from Johansson to Heyting (1935 -1936 reads [32] :
[ex falso] says that once ¬a has been proved, b follows from a, even if this had not been the case before.
This implies that the constructive interpretation of negation (i.e., implication) characteristic of intuitionism may give rise to doubts concerning the legitimacy of ex falso as an axiom of intuitionistic logic. More generally, by rejecting ex falso, one earns the right to study the notion of contradiction on its own and thereby, the related notion of negation.
The axiomatization proposed by Johansson preserves the whole positive fragment and most of the negative fragment of Heyting's intuitionistic logic. As a matter of fact, many important properties of negation provable in Heyting's system remain provable (in some cases, in a slighlty weakened form) in minimal logic. The absence of ex falso made Johansson's system the focus of interest in the field of paraconsistency, conceived as the study of those logics which admit inconsistent non-trivial theories. From a standard paraconsistent view, minimal logic still has unfortunate features [24] . In fact, the provability of what we are going to refer to as 'negative ex falso' (a ∧ ¬a) → ¬b makes negation meaningless in inconsistent theories-since every negated formula is provable-hence preserving some of the trivial aspects distinctive of ex falso. Interestingly enough, in the setting of positive logic, negative ex falso follows already from the assumption that negation is a functional antitone operator, i.e., that it satisfies the contraposition axiom (a → b) → (¬b → ¬a) [7, 8] . The latter is a theorem of Johansson's logic and one of its main 'sources of explosiveness'
1 . The two formulas mentioned in this paragraph will play a fundamental rôle throughout the paper. These formulas arose as central principles in the semantic investigations of [7, 8] . There, the class of those logics is studied that extend a basic logic of a unary operator axiomatized by (a ↔ b) → (¬a ↔ ¬b) over positive logic. The present paper can be seen as a continuation of the study of these logics in a proof-theoretic direction. It is worth mentioning that the system with contraposition as the only negation axiom (here, CoPC) has been considered as a theory of subminimal negation before: Hazen [14] , following a personal communication with Humberstone, arrives at this logics by weakening Johansson's original motivations, avoiding in particular the principle (a → ¬a) → ¬a. The same logic has also been discussed by Humberstone himself in [20, Section 8.33 ].
2
Working in a paraconsistent setting and with weaker notions of negation sounds appealing when dealing with phenomena such as descriptions of counterfactual situations or fictional objects, information in a computer data base, negations in natural language, etc. For instance, fragments of intuitionistic logic have been considered to formalize information flow or access control, mostly because of their good balance between expressivity and tractability. A relevant example in this direction can be found looking at the logic of infons [13] , used in Distributed Knowledge Authorization Language (DKAL): 'infons' are statements viewed as containers of information, and infon logic turns out to be a conservative extension of the positive and disjunction-free fragment of intuitionistic logic with certain simple multiagent modalities.
A formal study of the properties of (constructive) negation taken individually has the potential of disclosing unexplored paths in the study of negation in these more applied contexts. In this respect, we would like to point out the possibility of exploiting these studies in the setting of inquisitive logic [12, 5, 6] . The propositional fragment of inquisitive logic can be regarded as the disjunctive-negative fragment of intuitionistic logic, and negation plays a fundamental rôle in inquisitive semantics. Nonetheless, having a univocal notion of negation does not make it easy to model the many different shades of negation within natural language. An attempt to extending the inquisitive logic framework by adding a 'weak' negation has been already pursued in [26] , where to the persistent negation a weaker non-persistent negation is added, with the aim of taking care of problems as 'might'-sentences or sentences expressing denial of conditionals.
This short introduction is meant to outline where the study of weak negations and, in particular, our work find their roots and motivations. The search for a 'most appropriate' or 'significant' notion of constructive negation given a fixed positive setting suggests a broad but well-defined realm of possibility, whose uniform study is typical of algebraic semantics. An algebraic presentation of the logical systems of our interest is the focus of Section 2. This section is a condensed presentation of the results of [7, 2] , and earlier papers on which these articles are based. After this, the remaining and main part of the paper is concerned with the development of a proof theory for the relevant systems. While this proof-theoretic account lacks uniformity, the sequent calculi that we present happen to be the most natural ones, obtained via a straightforward translation of equations (or equivalently, Hilbert-style axioms) into sequent rules. First, cut-free Gentzen systems are presented in Section 3, and used in Section 4 to argue for fundamental results about the logical systems, such as Craig's interpolation, disjunction property, decidability. Later, the non-termination issues affecting the Gentzen systems are solved by means of a loop-checking history mechanism, presented and justified in Section 5. The latter concludes the paper, as the termination property of the modified calculi allows us to improve the decidability result from Section 4 to an argument that the considered logical systems are decidable in PSPACE.
Preliminaries
In this preliminary section we introduce the setting and present the main technical tools that will be used throughout the paper.
An algebraic semantics for minimal logic is given by the variety of contrapositionally complemented lattices. A contrapositionally complemented lattice is an algebraic structure A, ∧, ∨, →, 1, ¬ , where A, ∧, ∨, → , 1 is a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice 3 and the unary fundamental operation ¬ satisfies the identity (p → ¬q) → (q → ¬p) ≈ 1. A first algebraic account of Johansson's logic can be found in Rasiowa's main work on non-classical logics [27] . The variety presented by Rasiowa is term-equivalent to the variety of relatively pseudo-complemented lattices with a negation operator defined by the algebraic formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (p → q) ∧ (p → ¬q) → ¬p ≈ 1, originally employed in Johansson's axiomatization. Observe that Heyting algebras can be seen as contrapositionally complemented lattices where ¬1 is a distinguished bottom element 0.
As stated in the introduction, we focus on subsystems of minimal logic obtained by weakening Johansson's notion of negation. Algebraically, we start from a class of algebraic structures A, ∧, ∨, →, 1, ¬ that generalize contrapositionally complemented lattices [27] . Again A, ∧, ∨, →, 1 is a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice and the unary operation ¬ is restricted only by the identity:
We call these structures N-algebras, and we refer to the equivalent logical system as N. Note that this class of algebras play a fundamental rôle in the attempts of defining a connective over positive logic. In fact, the considered equation states that the function ¬ is a compatible function (or compatible connective), in the sense that every congruence of A, ∧, ∨, →, 1 is a congruence of A, ∧, ∨, →, 1, ¬ . This is somehow considered a minimal requirement when introducing a new connective over a fixed setting. A study of compatible connectives on Heyting algebras can be found in [4] , in the attempt of defining and studying new connectives over intuitionistic logic. In the setting of positive logic, a similar algebraic approach is carried out in [10] . Given the variety of N-algebras, we are particularly interested in two of its subvarieties that were implicitly considered in Section 1, and are defined, respectively, by the following identities:
Observe that 2.2 and 2.3 are algebraic formulations of, respectively, negative ex falso and the contraposition axiom, and for this reason we shall refer to the corresponding logics as negative ex falso logic (NeF) and contraposition logic (CoPC). Here, we also consider contrapositionally complemented lattices in terms of their term-equivalent variety of N-algebras defined by (p → q) → (¬q → ¬p) ≈ 1 plus (p → ¬p) → ¬p ≈ 1. It was proved in [7, 8, 2] that the following relations hold between the considered logical systems:
where the strict inclusion L 1 ⊂ L 2 means that every theorem of L 1 is a theorem of L 2 , and at least one theorem of L 2 is not provable in L 1 .
In the remainder of this paper we focus on a proof-theoretic study of (the logics corresponding to) these varieties. We will talk interchangeably about logical systems and their corresponding algebraic presentation, assuming an algebraic completeness result that goes beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore not included here. In order to keep the structure of the paper as clean as possible, the reader interested in a broader and introductory account of the topic from an algebraic perspective should refer to [7] . It is worth mentioning that in [7, 8] , the presentation and the study of these logical systems are developed also in a Kripke-style semantical framework. Finally, [2] is concerned with a deeper algebraic account of these logics, and a first study of their modal companions.
Sequent Calculi
Following the notation of [31] , we refer to the Gentzen systems introduced here as G3-systems. The letters p, q, . . . range over propositional variables, the Greek letters α, β, . . . , ϕ, . . . range over formulas, and Γ, ∆, . . . range over finite multisets of formulas. We write Γ, ∆ for the multiset obtained as the union of Γ and ∆. We consider the propositional language L(Prop), where Prop is a countable set of propositional variables, generated by the following grammar:
where p ∈ Prop. We consider ⊤ as a constant in the language, while we omit ⊥. We call a formula positive if it contains only connectives from {∧, ∨, →, ⊤}, and we refer to the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic as positive logic. We define the notion of weight (or complexity) w(ϕ) of a formula ϕ inductively as follows:
• w(p) = w(⊤) = 1, for every atom p;
• w(¬ϕ) = w(ϕ) + 1.
Logical Rules for Positive Connectives
Logical Rules for Negation In Figures 1 and 2 , four different sequent systems are presented. Keeping the rules for the positive connectives and the structural rules fixed, the rule (n) defines a proof system for N-algebras; by adding the rule (nef) and by substituting the rule (n) with (copc), we obtain systems for the two proper subvarieties of N-algebras defined, respectively, by 2.2 and 2.3. Finally, by adding the rule (an) to the system obtained with (copc), we obtain a sequent proof system for contrapositionally complemented lattices. Sequent proof systems for MPC were already introduced, e.g., in [31] , using a different presentation of MPC. In fact, MPC is often formulated with the negation ¬ϕ as a defined connective ϕ → f , where f is a distinguished propositional variable in the language. This formulation naturally suggests a sequent calculus for MPC obtained by discarding the axiom ruling the constant ⊥ from the system for intuitionistic propositional logic.
We call the height of a derivation ⊢ Γ ⇒ ϕ the number of inference steps of a maximal branch within a proof tree with root Γ ⇒ ϕ. A rule is said to be admissible if, whenever its premises are derivable in the system, so is the conclusion, and height-preserving admissible if, whenever its premises are derivable via a proof of height (at most) n ∈ N, then so is the conclusion. We say that an inference rule is invertible if, for every instance of the rule, the premises are derivable if, and only if, the conclusion is, and height-preserving invertible if the two derivations have the same height. It can be proved that all the rules in Figure 1 except (∨r 1 ), (∨r 2 ), (→l), (n), (nef) and (copc) are height-preserving invertible.
The arguments for admissibility of weakening (w) and contraction (c) are standard, and for the positive part of the calculus they can be adopted directly from a number of sources. Therefore we concentrate on the negative rules only, and refer the reader to the textbook [31] for the remaining cases. The full proofs can be found in [7] .
Proposition 3.1. The following weakening rule is height-preserving admissible:
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the height of a derivation of the premise sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ.
Suppose that the derivation (of height n) ends with an application of (n)
By the induction hypothesis twice, we have derivations
of height, respectively, at most m 1 and at most m 2 , where m 1 and m 2 are the height of derivations of the corresponding premises. By using (n), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ ¬γ. Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (nef)
By the induction hypothesis, we have a derivation ⊢ Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ β of height at most n−1. By using (nef), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (copc)
By the induction hypothesis, we have a derivation
of height at most n−1. By using (copc), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ ¬γ. Finally, suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (an)
of height at most n− 1. By using (an), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, α ⇒ ¬β.
Proposition 3.2. The following contraction rule is height-preserving admissible:
Proof. The proof goes by induction (with respect to the lexicographic order) on the pair (n, m), where n = w(α) and m is the height of a derivation of Γ, α, α ⇒ ϕ.
of height at most n−1. By using (nef), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ ¬γ. Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (nef) where α is a principal formula ¬α 1 :
of height at most n − 1. By using (nef), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬α 1 ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (copc) where α is not a principal formula:
of height at most n−1. By using (copc), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬β, α ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (copc) where α is a principal formula ¬α 1 :
of height at most n−1. By using (copc), we get a derivation of height at most n of the sequent Γ, ¬α 1 ⇒ ¬γ. Finally, suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (an)
A reader used to dealing with the sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic won't find it hard to believe the following fundamental result [7] . 
Elimination of Cut
It is often said that finding the right (i.e., sound and complete) set of rules for a logical system requires a certain amount of ingenuity. In order to carry out proof search in the sequent system, and to use the calculus to understand the corresponding logic, we seek to eliminate the cut rule. The family of calculi presented in Section 3 is obtained by translating in the most natural way equations into sequent rules, and consists of 'good' systems, in the sense that they are cut-free. We don't go into the details of the proof of cut admissibility, that are somehow standard and can be found in full in [7] . We will however outline the two interesting cases in the inductive proof-concerning the negative rules-and later focus on some relevant consequences ensuing from cut elimination. 
Proof. The proof goes by induction (with respect to the lexicographic order) on the pair (n, m), where n = w(α) and m is the combined heights of derivations of the premises, i.e., if ⊢ m1 Γ ⇒ α and ⊢ m2 ∆, α ⇒ ϕ, then m = m 1 + m 2 . We focus on the negative rules, and consider two cases: the case in which (only) the left premise is an axiom, and the case in which neither of the premises is an axiom and the formula α is principal in both of them. For the remainig cases, we refer to [31] and [7] . Consider the case in which the left premise is an axiom. Suppose that the last step in the derivation of the right premise is (n):
By using (n), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the last step in the derivation of the right premise is (nef):
By using (nef), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (copc):
By using (copc), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the last step in the derivation of the right premise is (an):
By using (an), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆ ⇒ ¬β.
Consider the case in which neither of the premises is an axiom, and the formula α is principal in both of them. The left sequent comes as the conclusion of a negation rule if and only if the right premise sequent does.
Suppose that the last step in the derivation of both premises is (n):
Again, by the induction hypothesis twice, and the contraction rule, we get
Finally, by using (n), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the last step in the derivation of the left premise is (n), and the right premise comes from an application of (nef):
But then, by the induction hypothesis, and the contraction rule, we get
Finally, by using (nef), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose that the last step in the derivation of both premises is (copc):
By the induction hypothesis again, and the contraction rule, we also get
Hence, by using (copc), we get a derivation of the sequent Γ, ∆, ¬β ⇒ ¬γ.
Suppose the derivation of the left premise ends with an application of (an), and the right premise comes from an application of (copc):
By the induction hypothesis again, and the weakening rule, we also get
But then, by using (an), we get a derivation of Γ, ∆ ⇒ ¬γ.
The remaining cases go similarly, and are left to the reader-who can also find them in [7] .
It is immediate to see that the calculi can be used to give an effective proof that, if the sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ∨ψ can be proved via a derivation of height n ∈ N, and Γ does not contain any disjunction, then (at least) one of the two sequents Γ ⇒ ϕ and Γ ⇒ ψ can be proved via a derivation of height at most n. The most striking consequence of cut elimination is the possibility of computable proof search, and hence, of providing a proof-theoretic decision method for the considered logics. As for complexity results, we cannot say much with the tools developed in the first part of the paper. In fact, proof search in the calculi presented in Figure 1 need not terminate, since we might encounter loops resulting in infinite branches.
Example 4.1. Consider a proof-search procedure for the sequent ¬¬¬p ⇒ ¬¬p in the calculus for CoPC. The only possibility is to consider a backward application of (copc), obtaining the sequent ¬¬¬p, ¬p ⇒ ¬¬p. At this point, considering a further backward application of (copc), with context ¬p, we get ¬¬¬p, ¬p, ¬p ⇒ ¬¬p, and we can already see that the bottom-up proof-search procedure does not necessarily terminate.
Observe that sequents of the form Γ, ϕ ⇒ ϕ can be proved to be derivable for every formula ϕ. By this and a straightforward induction on the height of a derivation, we can also prove that we can uniformly substitute formulas in derivable sequents obtaining derivable sequents. The following result reduces the number of negated formulas to be considered when dealing with any system containing the (copc) rule. Proof. The proof goes by induction on n ∈ N. The base case consists of presenting a derivation of the sequent ⇒ ¬¬¬p → ¬p. After an application of (→r), it is sufficient to apply to the obtained sequent ¬¬¬p ⇒ ¬p the rule (copc) three times, with principal formulas respectively the pairs (¬¬¬p, ¬p), (¬¬¬p, ¬¬p), and (¬p, ¬¬p). This leads to the axiom: ¬¬¬p, ¬p, ¬p, p ⇒ p (ax)
As for the induction step for n > 1, by the induction hypothesis and the invertibility of (→r), we have derivations of the sequents ¬ (2n−1) p ⇒ ¬p and ¬¬¬p ⇒ ¬p. From ¬ (2n−1) p ⇒ ¬p, by using (w) and (copc),
and hence, we get ¬¬p → ¬ (2n) p. Further, by (w) and (copc),
But then, by (cut),
Finally, by the induction hypothesis, the formula ¬ (2n−1) p → ¬p is a theorem. But then, by uniformly substituting ¬q for p in it, we obtain the desired ¬ (2n) q → ¬¬q.
It is worth mentioning a further application of the calculi, whose details can be found in [7, 8] . If ϕ is a formula in the language L(Prop), the inductively defined ∼ operator that leaves the atoms unchanged, maps ϕ • ψ to (ϕ ∼ • ψ ∼ ) for • ∈ {∧, ∨, →}, and ¬ϕ to (ϕ ∼ → ¬ϕ ∼ ), soundly and truthfully translates MPC into the logic CoPC (and, even more, into the logic N).
We conclude this section with a remark. It can be seen by looking at the rules of the proof systems presented in Figure 1 that none of the theorems of the logics N, NeF, and CoPC is of the form ¬ϕ (or, similarly, ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ). In fact, there is no way to start the proof search for a sequent of the form ⇒ ¬ϕ, since the only rules for negation that can be applied require the left-hand side of the sequent to contain a negated formula.
Craig's Interpolation
Craig's interpolation theorem states that for each provable implication φ → ψ, there exists an interpolant σ in the common language of ψ and φ, with both φ → σ and σ → ψ being provable. Syntactic proofs of this result for intuitionistic logic go back to Schütte [29] , and Maehara [23] (cf. [31] ), and use the idea of splitting sequents in Gentzen's calculus. We adopt the same method here, and prove the result by proof-theoretical means for the logics we consider in this paper, using the analytical calculi we have at hand.
By common language of two multisets of formulas Γ and ∆ we mean the set of propositional variables {p 1 , . . . , p n } that appear both in (at least) a formula from Γ and in (at least) a formula from ∆. It is not necessary to require the common language to be non-empty. In fact, if this is the case, the interpolant is given by the constant ⊤ (or by a formula obtained from ⊤ via negations). Proof. The proof goes by induction on the height of a derivation ⊢ Γ, ∆ ⇒ ϕ, where the induction hypothesis states that an interpolant σ exists for every possible splitting of the considered sequents. Given a sequent Γ, ∆ ⇒ ϕ, we use Γ ′ to denote a sub-multiset of Γ and ∆ ′ for a sub-multiset of ∆. We focus on the negative rules, and for the positive ones we refer to [31] .
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (n) of the form
By the induction hypothesis twice, there exist σ 1 and σ 2 in the common language of Γ ′ , ¬α and ∆, β such that the sequents Γ ′ , ¬α, α ⇒ σ 1 ; ∆, σ 1 ⇒ β; Γ ′ , ¬α, σ 2 ⇒ α; and ∆, β ⇒ σ 2 are derivable. We are going to prove that the desired interpolant is of the form:
First of all, observe that the considered formula is in the common language of Γ ′ , ¬α and ∆, β. It remains to find derivations of the sequents
By using (cut) and (c),
But then, by (→r), we get Γ ′ , ¬α ⇒ σ 2 → σ 1 , and we weaken it to obtain a derivation of Γ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 → σ 2 ⇒ σ 2 → σ 1 ( * ). Now, by using (w), (→l) and the derivability of the sequent Γ ′ , ¬α,
But then, by (w) and (n),
From the latter and from ( * ), by (∧r) and (→r),
At this point we start again and, by (cut), (c) and (→r), we get
Now, by (w), we obtain a derivation of
We shall use the obtained sequent as the left premise of an application of (→l), and hence, we look for a derivation of ∆, ((σ 2 → σ 1 ) ∧ ¬σ 1 ) ⇒ ¬β. By the induction hypothesis, we get the following derivations:
Suppose now that the derivation ends with an application of (n) of the form
By the induction hypothesis twice, there exist σ 1 and σ 2 in the common language of Γ and ∆ ′ , ¬α, β such that the sequents
Now, by (w), (n) and (∧l),
But now, given that σ 1 ∧ σ 2 is in the common language of Γ and ∆ ′ , ¬α, β, it is the desired interpolant. Now, suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (nef) of the form
By the induction hypothesis, there exists a formula σ 1 in the common language of Γ ′ , ¬α and ∆ such that the sequents Γ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 ⇒ α and ∆ ⇒ σ 1 are derivable. By (w), (nef) and (→l),
But also, by (nef) and (→r),
Now it is sufficient to notice that the formula σ 1 → ¬σ 1 is in fact in the common language of Γ ′ , ¬α and ∆ and hence, is the desired interpolant.
At this point, suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (nef) of the form
By the induction hypothesis, there exists σ 1 in the common language of Γ and ∆ ′ , ¬α such that the sequents Γ ⇒ σ 1 and ∆ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 ⇒ α are derivable. By a straightforward application of (nef), we get a derivation of ∆ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 ⇒ ¬β, and we conclude that σ 1 is the desired interpolant.
Suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (copc) of the form
By the induction hypothesis, there exists σ 1 in the common language of Γ ′ , ¬α and ∆, β such that the sequents Γ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 ⇒ α, and ∆, β ⇒ σ 1 are derivable. By using (copc) on the first sequent, we get a derivation of Γ ′ , ¬α ⇒ ¬σ 1 . Moreover, by (w) and (copc) we derive ∆, ¬σ 1 ⇒ ¬β.
Suppose now that the derivation ends with an application of (copc) of the form
By the induction hypothesis, there exists σ 1 in the common language of Γ and ∆ ′ , ¬α, β such that the sequents Γ ⇒ σ 1 , and ∆ ′ , ¬α, β, σ 1 ⇒ α are derivable. By (copc), we get a derivation of ∆ ′ , ¬α, σ 1 ⇒ ¬β. Hence, σ 1 is the desired interpolant. Finally, suppose that the derivation ends with an application of (an)
By the induction hypothesis, there is a formula σ 1 in the common language of Γ and ∆, ¬α such that the sequents Γ ⇒ σ 1 , and ∆, α, σ 1 ⇒ ¬α are derivable. By using (an) on the second sequent, we get a derivation of ∆, σ 1 ⇒ ¬α and hence, the desired interpolant is exactly σ 1 .
Terminating Systems
For the systems considered in the previous section, a naive backward proof search strategy is clearly not terminating (cf. Example 4.1). To obtain terminating systems, we adapt a history mechanism developed in [16] and [19] . We mention that the method employed here is obtained by modifying what in [19] is called 'Swiss history' (or 'Bern Approach'). For further literature, see, e.g., [16, 15] . Another variant is given by the so-called 'Scottish history' (or 'St. Andrews Approach') [17, 18] .
The original idea of preventing loops in a proof search using history mechanisms consists in adding a history to a sequent in order to store information about all the sequents that have occurred so far on a branch of a proof search tree. The method employed here is based on the assumption that storing goal formulas-given a sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ, we refer to the formula ϕ as the goal of the sequent-is sufficient to avoid possible loops.
We consider modifications of the G3 sequent calculi presented in Section 3. We use G3 ϕ to denote the modification of the G3 calculi obtained by considering the goals of the left rules to be restricted to atoms, negations or disjunctions. Here we call a left (respectively, right) rule an inference rule which introduces a principal formula on the left (respectively, right).
Further, we employ a history mechanism, and obtain the sequent calculi G3
Hist from Figures 3 and 4 . The goal formula ϕ in G3
Hist is again either an atom, a negation or a disjunction. Note that reading the G3 Hist rules bottom-up, the context is always non-decreasing; also, the left rules, the rule (→r), and the rule (an) have side conditions for the context and/or for the history. The side conditions make sure that we empty the history set only if the context is properly extended. If this is not the case, we keep the history as it is and, if necessary, we enhance it with the new goal formula. If we meet a sequent whose goal is already in the history, then we know that we are dealing with a loop. Therefore, having a derivation of the sequent H | Γ ⇒ ϕ in one of the G3
Hist systems amounts to saying that the proof tree of H | Γ ⇒ ϕ does not contain sequents of the form H ′ | Γ ⇒ ψ for every ψ ∈ H. Note that the rule (∧l) in the terminating system is not purely G3, but is a G2-type rule with Kleene's trick of building contraction in. We define the size of a proof tree as the number of nodes of the tree. The following result ensures that we can restrict ourselves to G3 ϕ .
Lemma 5.2. The sequent calculi G3 and G3 ϕ are equivalent.
Proof. It is trivial that if a sequent is provable in G3 ϕ , then is provable in G3. For the converse, the proof proceeds by induction on the height of a derivation.
Consider a G3 inference which is not a G3 ϕ inference. This must be an instance of a left rule with an implicational or a conjunctive goal. By the induction hypothesis, we have G3 ϕ derivations of the premises. This implies the implicational or conjunctive goals to be principal formulas in the premises. Hence, the result follows from the proof of [19, Proposition 4.1] .
with β ∈ Γ ∪ {¬α} and α ∈ Γ. By the induction hypothesis twice, with β ∈ Γ ∪ {α, ¬γ}, ¬β ∈ H and γ ∈ Γ ∪ {α}. By the induction hypothesis twice, we get and hence, by (copc 2 ), we can conclude Γ, ¬α ⇒ αwhere ¬β ∈ H ′ and H ′ ⊆ H. The new hybrid tree can be obtained now by removing from the old hybrid tree all the sequents from, and including, (¬β, H ′ ) | Γ, ¬α ⇒ α up to, and including, H | Γ, ¬α ⇒ ¬β. We can again proceed with an application of (copc 2 ) backwards to the first newly obtained sequent (we may need some contractions).
Finally, suppose that the last inference rule is (an). If the side condition of the history rule (an) is satisfied, we simply add the appropriate history to the premise. Otherwise, from the point of view of looping, both the premise and the conclusion are the same and we are in the presence of a trivial loop. The new hybrid tree is simply the old one with the premise obtained by contraction.
Theorem 5.2. Backwards proof search in the calculus G3
Hist is terminating.
Proof. Consider the weight of a sequent defined as a triple
of natural numbers, where k is the number of subformulas of Γ ∪ {ϕ} computed as a set, n is the number of formulas of Γ computed as a set, m is the number of formulas of H, and w is the weight of ϕ. It is easy to check that all the rules are such that the weight for the premises is lower than the one for the conclusion.
We exploit now the termination property of our sequent calculus and establish a bound on the complexity of the decision problem for the considered logical systems.
Theorem 5.3. There exists an algorithm for backwards proof search in the calculus G3
Hist that terminates in polynomial space.
Proof. Given a formula ϕ, we want to search for a proof of the sequent ∅ | ∅ ⇒ ϕ. We use a standard argument, inspecting the proof-search tree. If the weight of ϕ is w, the size of ∅ | ∅ ⇒ ϕ is (at most) (w, w, w), and decreases with every step of the search. Hence, it is enough to observe the following: the length of a branch in the proof-search tree is bounded by w 3 ; the branching degree of the tree is bounded by 2w; the number of formulas contained in any sequent occurring during the search can be seen to be bounded by O(w 2 ). Therefore, the result follows. More precisely, as we in fact always need to remember just one whole branch, an upper bound of the needed space is O(w 5 ).
Statman provides, in his seminal paper [30] , a polynomial translation of intuitionistic logic into its implicational fragment. As IPC is PSPACE-hard, so is its implicational fragment (see also [28] ). Therefore, any conservative extension of the implicational fragment of IPC is PSPACE-hard as well, including logics considered in this paper 5 . To sum up:
Corollary 5.1. The satisfiability problem for either one of the logical systems N, NeF, CoPC or MPC is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The inclusion in PSPACE is Theorem 5.3. Hardness follows from the fact that all the logics we consider are conservative extensions of the implication fragment of intuitionistic logic, known to be PSPACEhard [30, 28] .
Conclusions and Further Research
The question whether the logics addressed in this paper enjoy the property of uniform interpolation remains open. We conclude the article with some comments and remarks on this problem.
Uniform interpolation is a strengthening of the Craig interpolation property, claiming that for each formula φ( q, p) there exists a post-interpolant ∃ qφ( p) such that: (1) φ → ∃ qφ is provable, and (2) for each ψ( p, r) with φ → ψ provable, also ∃ qφ → ψ is provable. Symmetrically, for each ψ( p, r) there exists a preinterpolant ∀ rψ( p) such that: (1) ∀ rψ → ψ is provable, and (2) for each φ( q, p) with φ → ψ provable, φ → ∀ rψ is provable as well. Note that here we deliberately confuse the existence of a post-interpolant and a preinterpolant with the possibility of simulating propositional quantification. In terms of the Craig interpolation property, uniform interpolation means that there are a least (∃ qφ) and a greatest (∀ rψ) interpolant with respect to 'provability order', for each provable implication φ( q, p) → ψ( p, r). The interpolants are unique up to provable equivalence.
Uniform interpolation for intuitionistic propositional logic has been originally proved by Pitts in [25] , using proof-theoretical means. As for positive logic, the pre-interpolation property does not hold in full generality. Nevertheless, the 'failing' cases are of the following form. Given the formula p → r, its preinterpolant ∀r(p → r) in intuitionistic logic is equivalent to the formula ¬p, and there is no formula in the language of positive logic containing only p that does the job: for every formula φ(p, q) in the positive language, φ(p, q) → (p → r) is not valid. This is a typical pathological case, and in all the other cases, the preinterpolant exists. This result was proved in [9] , where de Jongh and Zhao obtained uniform interpolation for positive logic, and for MPC (in the language with the constant f ); the MPC uniform interpolant is obtained from the one of intuitionistic logic, by means of a clever construction of a positive content ϕ + associated to a formula ϕ.
We focus here on the possibility of proving uniform interpolation for the logic defined by the contraposition axiom. Also in this case, pre-interpolants do not always exist. In fact, the same example as in the case of positive logic does the job: if we consider again ∀r(p → r), no formula containing only the variable p can work as an interpolant. Similarly to the MPC case, it is also true that φ(p, q) → (p → r) does not hold for any φ(p, q) in the language. One is therefore tempted to conjecture that the revised MPC version of uniform (pre-)interpolation could go through in this setting, and try to derive the uniform interpolation property for the logic CoPC (and possibly, for NeF) from that of MPC. However, some simple differences between the two cases are clear: for instance, observe that ∀r(p → ¬r) ↔ ¬p holds in MPC, while ∀r(p → ¬r) ↔ (p → ¬p) holds only in the presence of the contraposition axiom, and moreover p → ¬p is the translation of the MPC interpolant by the ∼ translation: (¬p) ∼ = (p → ¬p) (see the remark after Proposition 4.1). It would however be naive to hope that the uniform interpolants in the contraposition case can always be obtained by translation. In fact, a counterexample is given by the following observation: it is possible to construct a uniform pre-interpolant ∀r(¬p ∧ q → ¬r) for the formula (¬p ∧ q → ¬r) in the logic defined by the contraposition axiom, such interpolant being of the form ¬p → (q → ¬q); however, the latter is not (equivalent to) the translation of the corresponding MPC interpolant ¬p → ¬q.
We have not been able so far to prove or refute the uniform interpolation property for any of the logics N, NeF, and CoPC, and we leave it for further considerations, algebraic or proof-theoretic.
